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IDENTIFYING THE HARM IN RACIAL
GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS
Samuel Issacharoff*
Thomas C. Goldstein**
INTRODUCTION
The pace of change in the desegregation of American politics is
sometimes overlooked by those immersed in the struggles over
issues of minority representation. Gauged from afar, the aptly
termed "Quiet Revolution"' in legally enforced minority voting
rights is properly viewed as a stunning vindication of the trans-
formative power of law. In one recent study of the integration of
political office holding, for example, Australian political scientist
Anne Phillips speaks admiringly of the post-1965 American ex-
perience as a "major success story,"
where civil rights litigation has interpreted the 1965 Voting
Rights Act to imply the right of minority voters to elect 'the
candidates of their choice.' When first introduced, the
legislation was concerned primarily with guaranteeing black
voters their equal right to vote ....
The subsequent evolution of the Act extended it to address
the right to cast an equally weighted vote, which increasingly
meant the creation of black majority districts ... from which
black voters could elect black representatives .... Voting rights
litigation then came to revolve around the formation of single-
member electoral districts, with their boundaries drawn so as
* Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of
Law. B.A. 1975, SUNY at Binghamton; J.D. 1983, Yale Law School.
** Law Clerk, Honorable Patricia M. Wald, Circuit Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. B.A. 1992, University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1995, Washington College of Law.
1. The term comes from a masterful empirical study of the transformation in
southern politics brought about by the Voting Rights Act. QUIET REVOLUTrION IN THE
SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson &
Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
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to coincide with black majorities.2
As Professor Phillips properly notes, for twenty years the
judicially crafted doctrine of "minority vote dilution" has acted as a
major force facilitating the growth of minority political power in this
country.3 After barriers to the participation of Black voters in
elections were struck down, courts developed the doctrine as a
means of eliminating schemes by which states and localities diluted
the ability of groups of minorities to elect candidates of their choice.4
In particular, under the aegis of both the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Voting Rights Act, courts mandated the displacement of
multimember electoral districts (which overrewarded cohesive
White voting blocs) with single-member districts (including major-
ity-Black and Hispanic districts), thereby laying the foundation for
our history's largest growth in minority representation.' Throughout
the 1980s, the voting rights revolution, compounded by the post-
1990 reapportionment, quietly transformed not just the racial
makeup of governmental bodies, but the distribution of actual
political power as well.
In several recent decisions beginning with Shaw v. Reno6 in 1993,
however, the Supreme Court has dramatically undermined the most
evident and, to date, most successful mechanism for expanding
minority representation: the race-based creation of majority-
minority electoral districts.7 Five Justices-Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-have now concluded that redis-
tricting plans should be subject to "strict scrutiny" review in those
instances where race has served as the predominant factor in the
drawing of district lines.8
Almost all students of this "racial gerrymandering" doctrine
agree that the constitutional commands of Shaw and its progeny
leave a great deal unresolved-most notably the relevance of
"traditional districting principles" as indicators of improper racial
motivation,9 as well as just how "strict" the Court's scrutiny will be.
2. ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 85-86 (1995).
3. Accord Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting
Racial and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 1, at
21,22-29.
4. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
5. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755 (1973); Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
6. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
7. Id.; see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); United States v. Hays, 115
S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
8. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2490.
9. Compare Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827 ("[Traditional districting principles] are
objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been
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Clarification of the appropriate legal standard remains in the
Court's hands with two cases submitted for review this year,'° and
several other likely candidates to be heard next Term. The focus of
this Article, however, is somewhat different from the bulk of the
commentary to date, which (including some of our own previous
efforts) has sought to dissect the legal standards applicable to federal
courts' post-Shaw review of minority districts. In this Article, we
want instead to give particular attention to the concerns that may
have motivated the Court to announce this new doctrine in the first
instance. We offer this approach, in a sense, not as an attempt to
elucidate how the Court intends to police the racial considerations
present in redistricting battles, but to concentrate on why the delicate
issue of racial representation poses such concern for the Court.
We proceed along two lines. First, we review the theories of
harm set forth in the Justices' various opinions, i.e., the articulated
risks to individual rights that may or may not be presented by racial
gerrymandering. What we learn from this survey is that Shaw and its
progeny serve different purposes for different members of the
Court. Four members of the Shaw, Miller v. Johnson," and United
States v. Hays12 majorities-Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-are far more concerned with
"race" than "gerrymandering." In particular, they consider all race-
based government classifications to be inherently injurious, and they
appear to view the racial gerrymandering cases as a vehicle for
moving the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment
closer to the ideal of "colorblindness.' '
Diametrically opposed, the dissenters-Justices Stevens and
Souter, joined by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg (who now occupy the
seats of Shaw dissenters White and Blackmun)-argue that the
majority has consistently conflated two very different questions:
whether government action violates the Fourteenth Amendment,
and whether that action harms the plaintiffs sufficiently to establish
standing to sue." While these four Justices have concluded that the
gerrymandered on racial lines .... [W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in
which appearances do matter.") with Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486 ("[S]hape is relevant
not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the constitutional wrong or a
threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be persuasive circumstantial
evidence.... .") and Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2431 (omitting all reference to "appearances"
and "traditional districting principles").
10. Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994), prob. juris. noted, 115 S. Ct.
2639 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994), prob. juris. noted, 115 S.
Ct. 2639 (1995).
11. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
12. 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
13. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2482-83.
14. Id. at 2497. Justice Stevens, in dissent, stated:
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creation of majority-minority districts violates no constitutional
command in the first instance, they also are emphatic in their
position that, certainly, the White plaintiffs who have come before
the Court to date have suffered no cognizable injury."5
Between these two groups, the fifth member of the majority-
Justice O'Connor-agrees that racial classifications carry dangers,
but differs from the others on both the precise degree of racial
motivation that causes harm and just what that harm is. 6 Under
O'Connor's interpretation of Shaw in her concurrence in Miller,
concern is warranted only in "extreme instances." This four-one-four
split within the Court confirms the widely held view that it is Justice
O'Connor's vote that will carry the day. We therefore turn our
attention to her concerns in particular, and, in the second step of our
analysis, consider whether there might be some factor that causes
Justice O'Connor to identify certain redistricting schemes as more
"extreme" than others.
Our review is organized from the vantage point of a well-
intentioned state actor seeking to achieve some level of accom-
modation of minority concerns for representation, while at the same
time seeking to avoid running afoul of constitutional constraints.
The hope is that if, ultimately, this area of law is to find some
institutional stasis under the current Court, some sense of the precise
constitutional harm may be key. Our conclusions, however, remain
tentative and pessimistic. While there are some clear forms of harm
that the Court has responded to, such as the Department of Justice's
expansive use of its powers under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
to pressure a "maximization" of minority representation, there is
deep uncertainty at the core of the Court's ruling in Shaw and its
progeny. At best, a strategy of avoiding those harms clearly
identified thus far in the caselaw can provide only partial cover from
challenge for any redistricting plan seeking a balance between
minority representation and the avoidance of racial gerrymandering
charges.
First, the Court misapplied the term 'gerrymander,' previously used to describe
grotesque line drawing by a dominant group to maintain or enhance its political
power at a minority's expense, to condemn the efforts of a majority (whites) to
share its power with a minority (African Americans). Second, the Court
dispensed with its previous insistence in vote dilution cases on a showing of
injury to an identifiable group of voters, but it failed to explain adequately what
showing a plaintiff must make to establish standing to litigate the newly minted
Shaw claim. Neither in Shaw itself nor in the cases decided today has the Court
coherently articulated what injury this cause of action is designed to redress.
Because respondents have alleged no legally cognizable injury, they lack standing,
and these cases should be dismissed.
15. Id. at 2497.
16. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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I. THE SHAw V. RENo LEGACY: CLASSIFICATORY AND REPRESENTATIVE HARMS
Focusing on the concept of "harm" is particularly appropriate in
the racial gerrymandering context because it is on this issue that the
battle lines between the Justices have been most heatedly drawn.
The bulk of the analysis in Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
in Shaw was devoted to the relatively uncontroversial proposition
that it is both possible and appropriate to infer that a district's
design was motivated to some extent by race from both its shape
and the demographic characteristics of the communities that it
includes and excludes. 17 Thus, it is a good guess that a district that
consistently "meanders" to include only Black communities while
conspicuously dodging adjacent White neighborhoods was design-
ed, at least in part, with race in mind. 8 Without a doubt, the Court
had taken that inferential step in several previous decisions, and the
dissenters-correctly or not---chose not to challenge its continued
use in Shaw.9 In part, the limited focus of the dissenters may be
explained by the seemingly uncontroversial ultimate holding of the
Court in Shaw. For all the rhetorical force of comparisons of racial
line drawing to "apartheid," Shaw held only that districts drawn
based "only" on race were constitutionally actionable.
The dissenters did, however, zero in on the fact that, no matter
how racially motivated the design of the challenged districts, it was
far from clear that anyone had been injured by them in a cognizable
fashion. 20 Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
attempted to locate Shaw squarely within the framework of the
Court's prior decisions addressing vote deprivation and vote
dilution:
17. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2825-27 (discussing Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52
(1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347 (1915)).
18. At first blush, this may seem a remarkable understatement. But, in redis-
tricting, like few other areas, appearances can be deceiving, and what would seem
obviously to be the principal impetus behind a district's construction may be far
from it. See, e.g., Conference Report, The Supreme Court, Racial Politics, and the Right to
Vote: Shaw v. Reno and the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 31
(1994).
19. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2841 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and
Stevens, ff.).
20. See id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.) ("The
grounds for my disagreement with the majority are simply stated: Appellants have
not presented a cognizable claim, because they have not alleged a cognizable
injury."); id. at 2847 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[In voting-rights cases], it has seemed
more appropriate for the Court to identify impermissible uses [of race] by describing
particular effects sufficiently serious to justify recognition under the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
WiNEr 19961
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To date, we have held that only two types of state voting
practices could give rise to a constitutional claim. The first
involves direct and outright deprivation of the right to vote,
for example by means of a poll tax or literacy test. Plainly, this
variety is not implicated by appellants' allegations and need
not detain us further. The second type of unconstitutional
practice is that which "affects the political strength of various
groups," in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. As for this
latter category, we have insisted that members of the political
or racial group demonstrate that the challenged action have
the intent and effect of unduly diminishing their influence on
the political process."
Justice Souter, in a solo dissent, agreed with this charac-
terization of the Court's precedents," and like Justice White,
concluded that, without more, the act of drawing districts along
racial lines caused no constitutionally cognizable harm.u Instead,
"an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral
system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their oppor-
tunity to influence the political process effectively."24 According to
the dissenters, the White plaintiffs in Shaw suffered no such harm
because, while Blacks may have been advantaged by North
Carolina's creation of two majority-Black districts, Whites were not
sufficiently disadvantaged to make out a constitutional claim, given
that they remained the majority in a disproportionate number of the
state's congressional districts.
21. Id. at 2834 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (quoting City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
22. Id. at 2847. Justice White and Justice Souter disagreed to some extent on the
reason that the Court had been more permissive in allowing race-conscious decision
making in voting rights cases than other areas. According to Justice White, as a
practical matter, legislatures frequently use race as a proxy for other characteristics
(e.g., party preference) in drawing racial lines, and therefore "extirpating such
considerations from the redistricting process is unrealistic." Id. at 2835. Justice
Souter added the gloss that the greater latitude allowed to state uses of racial
considerations in the political arena inevitably arises from the fact that the Voting
Rights Act requires that legislatures take race into account to avoid minority vote
dilution, a practice that the Court has consistently approved. Id. at 2845. Further,
purposefully benefiting one race in the redistricting process does not necessarily
prejudice members of other races; while awarding a contract preference to a
minority firm arguably undermines the ability of White-owned firms to compete for
the contract, the act of creating majority-minority districts prevents no individual or
group from voting, and generally does not interfere with the voting strength of
Whites statewide. Id. at 2846-47.
23. Id. at 2846.
24. Id. at 2836 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133
(1986) (plurality opinion)).
25. Id. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting).
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The Shaw majority presented a bifurcated response to this line
of argument. First, it posited that all racial classifications should be
considered constitutionally suspect:
Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race "are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality." They threaten to
stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a racial
group and to incite racial hostility.26
Second-and building on this notion of stigma-the majority
identified a set of "special harms that are not present in . . . vote
dilution cases."27 These "representational harms" were more akin to
the injuries recognized in the dilution context, however, in that they
involved dangers related to the political process. The majority was
reaching for a notion of a harm to the political process as a whole
that transcended the individuals subject to a state classificatory
system. While imprecise, these harms clearly involved the act of
"gerrymandering," and appeared to be triggered by the shape of the
resulting districts. Thus, the majority concluded that
reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter.
A reapportionment plan that includes in one district
individuals who belong to the same race, but who are
otherwise widely separated by geographical and political
boundaries, and who may have little in common with one
another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable
resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the perception
that members of the same racial group-regardless of their
age, education, economic status, or the community in which
they live--think alike, share the same political interests, and
will prefer the same candidates at the polls. We have rejected
such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereo-
types. By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may
exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-
minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. 
2
Besides this paragraph-long statement, and a later recapsul-
ization of it,2 however, the Shaw majority did not detail a precise
26. Id. at 2824 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
27. Id. at 2828.
28. Id. at 2827 (citations omitted).
29. See id. at 2828 ("[Racial gerrymandering] reinforces racial stereotypes and
threatens to undermine our system of representative democracy by signaling to
elected officials that they represent a particular racial group rather than their
WINTER 1996]
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theory of how these harms might come about. Perhaps more
perplexing, given the Court's decision to remand Shaw (and in light
of the numerous other similar cases predictably working their way
up through the trial courts), was the failure to indicate what sort of
evidence might sustain a claim of excessive reliance on race in the
redistricting process.'3 The question had not been briefed by the
parties or amici, and the opinion did not refer to any literature
demonstrating that what seemed to be an empirically verifiable
phenomenon, in fact, ever took place. Instead, to the dissenters'
plaint that the universe of constitutionally cognizable harms in
voting-rights cases included only vote deprivation and vote dilution,
the majority said, essentially, "not any more."
II. THE PoSr-SHAw INTERLUDE
That the majority's "representational harms" were analytically
wanting quickly became apparent in the post-Shaw round of
litigation and scholarly criticism. On remand in Shaw itself,3' and in
various cases before three-judge district court panels throughout the
country,32 judges and litigants alike were befuddled about how to
proceed on the question of injury, heretofore thought to be the crux
of every plaintiff's burden of establishing standing.3 In earlier
generations of voting-rights litigation concerning both access to the
ballot and the dilutive impact of at-large electoral systems, the link
between standing and liability had been clear. Standing to sue
flowed ineluctably from the fact that Black and Latino plaintiffs had
their voting strength as a group diluted m
constituency as a whole.").
30. For an elucidation of the theory of "excessive reliance" on race as the key to
Shaw, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:
Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 608-18 (1993).
31. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408,421-27 (E.D.N.C. 1994), prob. juris. noted, 115 S.
Ct. 2639 (1995).
32. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1370 (S.D. Ga. 1994) ("In both
Shaw and the instant case, the plaintiffs suffered no individual harm; the 1992
congressional redistricting plans had no adverse consequences for these White
voters. Under the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements, this lack of
concrete, individual harm would deny them standing to sue."), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2475
(1995).
33. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. at 424 ("The Supreme Court has
emphasized that such a[n] injury must be 'concrete' in both a qualitative and a
temporal sense, which means that it must be both 'distinct and palpable' in nature,
as opposed to '[a]bstract,' and 'real and immediate' as opposed to 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."' (citations omitted)).
34. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (upholding at-large
elections for failure to prove constitutionally impermissible purpose); Lassiter v.
Northhampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (upholding literacy tests
against challenge).
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If, however, standing became detached from any electoral in-
jury, it became unclear what harm could be proven at trial by
concerned but seemingly unaffected White litigants. Thus, in the
North Carolina racial gerrymandering trial, was there to be evidence
presented that newly elected representatives Mel Watt and Eva
Clayton in fact represented only the interests of their Black North
Carolina constituents, leaving Whites politically ghettoized? Could
the plaintiffs present testimony that their children had been
stigmatized, with playmates from across town taunting them that
they lived in a Black district?3s
In the end, a general consensus seemed to develop that the
"representational harms" were essentially to be assumed as the
result of race-based districting.3 For the plaintiffs, this was a good
thing; the harms would have been difficult to prove within the terms
assigned by Shaw. If the plaintiffs' injuries were based on the claim
that legislators would only represent, and voters would only elect,
members of their own race, then Shaw's claim that such assumptions
were fanciful and perpetuated racial stereotypes would have been
disproved. Proof of harm to White plaintiffs would in turn lend
support to the state's claim that racial considerations were necessary
to accommodate legitimate minority concerns over representational
opportunity. 37 Further, a holding that Whites were harmed by
submersion in majority-Black districts similarly could serve as
justification for the very considerations of race that they were
intended to assail. For example, it might be argued that Blacks
would be better served by having their influence enhanced in
districts where they provided a critical voting bloc, although not a
majority. If this argument is correct, and if legislators are acutely
sensitive to the shifting racial composition of their districts, then
White challengers should not be harmed by inclusion in the
majority-minority districts under challenge in the racial gerry-
mandering cases; these districts are, by and large, the nation's most
racially integrated.m The expected result under this line of proof
would be exactly the opposite of that predicted in Shaw-Mel Watt,
who represents North Carolina's Twelfth Congressional District,
35. The point of our inquiry is not to endorse a restrictive standing doctrine per
se. Rather, it is to signal the departure from developed standing doctrine and to
show the relation between unclear standing doctrines and unclear notions of proof of
harm at trial.
36. See, e.g., Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994), prob. juris. noted,
115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 426 (E.D.N.C. 1994), prob.
juris. noted, 115 S. Ct. 2639 (1995).
37. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2497-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. See Deval L. Patrick, What's Up Is Down, What's Black Is White, 44 EMORY L.J.
827, 833 (1995).
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with its forty-five percent White constituency, would presumably
run an enormous risk if he alienated White voters, while legislators
from majority-White districts (which tend to have very low
proportions of minority populations) would have little incentive to
cater to the interests of minority voters. And, as to appearance, the
Court completely failed to explain how the Justices' obvious
aesthetic discomfort correlated with a rise in racial stigmatization.
The problem lies in the vagaries of translating the generalized
concerns evident in Shaw into an operational command for trial. In
particular, lower courts faced the question whether the post-Shaw
round of cases could proceed solely on the basis of the general
harms that Shaw had identified as the result of all racial
classifications, an approach suggested by several sympathetic
readers of Shaw." While several pre-Shaw decisions had criticized
racial classifications as contrary to the spirit of the Fourteenth
Amendment,4° the Court had never previously struck down chal-
lenged legislation without identifying some particularized harm to
the plaintiffs. For example, in two relatively recent decisions
concerning racial preferences in government contracting, the Court
had significantly eased the "injury-in-fact" requirement for standing
to challenge adverse governmental action, but still took care to
explain that White-owned companies had been injured by their
inability to compete on equal footing with minority firms.4'
Under a more relaxed standing requirement, plaintiffs in such
cases might be relieved of the requirement of showing that they
personally would have received the desired governmental benefit
but for the use of a classificatory mechanism. Yet, prior to the racial
gerrymandering cases, there was no hint that plaintiffs would not
39. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Racial Gerrymandering and Vote Dilution: Shaw v.
Reno in Doctrinal Context, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 517, 528 (1995) ("The injury was the
commonly held interest in requiring state government to adhere to the racial
nondiscrimination precepts purportedly embraced in the principles of Equal
Protection."); Timothy G. O'Rourke, Shaw v. Reno: The Shape of Things to Come, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 723, 736 (1995) ("In suggesting that the plaintiffs had suffered no injury
because their group (White voters) was fairly treated, Justice Souter missed the point.
What the plaintiffs were asserting is the right to be treated as individual voters,
rather than with reference to their putative membership in a group."); Abigail
Thernstrom, More Notes from a Political Thicket, 44 EMORY L.J. 911, 940 (1995) ("Racial
classifications, in short, deliver the message that skin color matters-profoundly.
They suggest that White folks and Black folks just are not the same, that race and
ethnicity are the qualities that really matter.").
40. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,
432 (1984); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
41. Northeastern Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667 (1993); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
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have to show that they, at the least, would have been within the
zone of consideration absent the challenged governmental policy.
Similarly, voting rights decisions prior to Shaw had included this
element by requiring plaintiffs to prove that they had suffered either
the dilution of their voting strength as a group or the outright
deprivation of their right to vote.
Lower courts were thus left with no realistic prospect that any
justiciable standard could be fashioned that would allow plaintiffs to
prove Shaw's underlying conception of representational harms.
Moreover, lower courts were left with great uncertainty about
whether standing could be based on generalized concerns about
racial classifications. At the same time, however, they were equally
sure that the Supreme Court would not have gone to the trouble of
creating a doctrine with absolutely no practical effect.' They
therefore went about processing racial gerrymandering cases by
essentially ignoring all questions of injury.
That was not possible in every case, however, as a progressively
wider array of plaintiffs began challenging a progressively wider
array of districts. Cleo Fields' district in Louisiana, for example, was
challenged by several voters, none of whom lived in the district
itself." This raised the question of whether, even if the plaintiffs
were not required to present evidence that they personally had
suffered the harms suffered in Shaw, there was nonetheless some
requirement that they be connected to the purposefully created
majority-minority district.
In addition, plaintiffs brought challenges to districts that were
nowhere nearly as bizarrely shaped as those reviewed in Shaw itself.
This brought the question of injury to the fore as well, given the fact
that Shaw seemed to predicate its "representational harms" on the
physical appearance of malformed majority-minority districts.4 If
"appearances do matter," what was to be thought of a district that
was constructed based on race, but neither mirrored an interstate
42. See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest For Political Equality, 77 VA.
L. REV. 1413, 1422-23 (1991). See generally Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 30
(criticizing the Shaw Court for its failure to resolve the issue of whether race may be
justifiably relied upon in redistricting).
43. This would remove the post-Shaw cases from the fate of Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109 (1986), at the hands of the lower courts. When Bandemer announced that
claims of partisan gerrymandering would be constitutionally cognizable, the
resulting evidentiary standard proved so elusive as to leave no meaningful trail in
the lower courts. See Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial
Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1643, 1670-85 (1993).
44. See Hays v. Louisiana, 862 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1994), vacated sub nom.
United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
45. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827.
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highway (as does North Carolina's Twelfth"), nor resembled a "bug
splattered on a windshield" (as North Carolina's First was com-
plained to do47), and was instead essentially cartographically dull?
Should representational harms be presumed to be the result of that
district as well?"
III. POST-SHAW THEORIES OF HARM
A. Miller's Theory: Stereotyping
The importance of shape was directly presented by a challenge
to Georgia's Eleventh District in Miller v. Johnson, 49 a case heard by
the Supreme Court in its October 1994 Term. While the Eleventh
District had several malformed appendages, the bulk of its land
mass was a geographically unremarkable central core, and
according to several objective measures, the district was as re~alarly
shaped as most of the state's majority-White districts. The
defenders of the Eleventh District therefore argued that, no matter
how important race had been to its construction, the district was not
so bizarrely shaped as to trigger Shaw's concern for appearances."
Rather than attempting to wage a battle of aesthetic tastes, the same
five Justices that had constituted the Shaw majority held that,
properly understood, Shaw was not actually about "a district's
appearance (or, to be more precise, its appearance in combination
with certain demographic evidence). ' 2 Instead, appearance was
simply one of an unspecified number of potential tools to unearth
"circumstantial evidence" of racial motivation.5 3
Having thereby discounted any notion that Shaw was a case
uniquely about districting or district shape, Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the majority only glancingly mentioned the issue of
46. Id. at 2820-21.
47. Id. at 2820 (quoting WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at A14).
48. See Blumstein, supra note 39, at 531 (describing Shaw plaintiffs' claim as that of
"an individuated right not to be placed in a district whose boundary is race-
determined even if the race of which plaintiffs were a member was not
disadvantaged as a group").
49. 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
50. See id. at 2489 ("[Bly comparison with other districts the geometric shape of
the Eleventh District may not seem bizarre on its face .... "); see also id. at 2502-03 &
nn.3-4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 2485.
52. Id. at 2486.
53. Id. at 2486-87.
[VOL. 1:47
Identifying Racial Harms
"representational harms." 4 Instead, according to Miller, the racial
gerrymandering doctrine is simply an extension of the Court's
earlier decisions concerning the general practice of race-based
government decision making, as evidenced by Shaw's discussion of
the general harms of racial classifications.s' But, while Shaw had
discussed the inherently "odious" nature of such classifications and
the resulting risk of stigmatization, Justice Kennedy described as the
premise of the Fourteenth Amendment that the government should
not stereotype individuals on the basis of their race:
[T]he essence of the equal protection claim recognized in Shaw
is that the State has used race as a basis for separating voters
into districts. Just as the State may not, absent extraordinary
justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public
parks, buses, golf courses, beaches, and schools, so did we
recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its citizens into
different voting districts on the basis of race. The idea is a
simple one: "At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection lies the simple command that the Government
must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a
racial, religious, sexual or national class.56
Specifically, the act of drawing district lines on the basis of race
with certain electoral outcomes in mind is "based on the demeaning
notion that members of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain
'minority views' that must be different from those of other citizens,
the precise use of race as a proxy the Constitution prohibits."5 7
If this proposition from Miller were to stand as an
unadulterated definition of the law of equal protection, the effect
would be of tremendous sweep. As the passages quoted from
Professor Phillips at the start of this Article indicate, even a distant
observer could not help but be struck by the tremendous
transformative energy in American politics unleashed by the use of
race-conscious remedial tools under the aegis of the Voting Rights
Act. Prior to Miller, the Court had not upheld a frontal assault upon
such race-conscious measures, but had under the pen of Justice
O'Connor expressed grave concern that claims of remediation could
54. See id. at 2486; see also id. at 2497 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing how the
Shaw Court explained the concept of representational harm).
55. Id. at 2486-87.
56. Id. at 2485-86 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995)).
57. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), quoted in Miller,
115 S. Ct. at 2487.
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yield to a renewed racial factionalism. This was clearest in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,s' where O'Connor identified the
remedial claims underlying a generous municipal minority set-aside
program as an invitation to a racial spoils system in the distribution
of city contracts.5 9 The key was not simply that racial classifications
had been utilized, but rather that the wielders of power were no
longer a White community seeking to burden itself. Instead, the
Richmond minority set-aside was established by a new generation of
Black elected officials, the very minority political powers that had
been brought to office through the voting rights revolution. Under
this circumstance, race was suspect not because of a per se desire to
close the door to all further remedial efforts along America's
persistent racial divide, but rather because claims of historical
injustice could be thought to serve as a screen for interest group
demands of the present.6° To the extent that Shaw emanated from
O'Connor's concerns articulated in Croson, there remained a differ-
ence between race-conscious measures inspired by a continuing
legacy of exclusion and the use of race as the coin of the realm in de-
manding interest group benefits.'
In light of the persistent four-one-four divide on the Court in its
equal protection jurisprudence, what is to be made of Justice
O'Connor's vote in Miller? Although O'Connor joined the opinion of
the Court and thereby lent the indispensable fifth vote for Justice
Kennedy, she also added a concurrence that is widely viewed as an
important limit on Miller's scope. While Justice Kennedy's opinion
focused on the "demeaning" assumptions on which the entire
concept of race-conscious districting is based,62 O'Connor strongly
suggested that gerrymanders come in various gradations, only the
"extreme instances" of which contravene the Fourteenth Amend-
58. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
59. Id. at 506 ("If a 30% set-aside was 'narrowly tailored' to compensate Black
contractors for past discrimination, one may legitimately ask why they are forced to
share this 'remedial relief' with an Aleut citizen who moves to Richmond tomorrow?
The gross overinclusiveness of Richmond's racial preference strongly impugns the
city's claim of remedial motivation.").
60. See Daniel A. Farber, Richmond and Republicanism, 41 FLA. L. REV. 623, 623-24
(1989) (interpreting O'Connor as emphasizing the importance of keeping open the
prospect of political deliberation as opposed to strategic politics).
61. Croson, 488 U.S. at 495-96 ("In this case, blacks constitute approximately 50
percent of the population of the city of Richmond. Five of the nine seats on the city
council are held by blacks. The concern that a political majority will more easily act
to the disadvantage of a minority based on unwarranted assumptions or incomplete
facts would seem to militate for, not against, the application of heightened judicial
scrutiny in this case.").
62. Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2487.
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ment.' Thus, she wrote, "[t]o invoke strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must
show that the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of
customary and traditional districting practices."" Under this view,
the uncertainty of the harm inherited from the Shaw analysis persists
and is fundamentally unaltered by Miller. Moreover, on its own
'terms, this standard leaves unanswered what it is that strict scrutiny
is supposed to scrutinize. A standard of review cannot exist inde-
pendent of a substantive conception of rights and wrongs that are to
be examined, no matter how exacting that examination.
B. Hays' Theory: The Denial of Equal Treatment
While Justice O'Connor's Miller concurrence did not expressly
touch on the plaintiffs' injury, she did address the issue in her
opinion for the Court regarding the challenge to Cleo Fields'
Louisiana district in United States v. Hays," a decision handed down
on the same day as Miller. The Court unanimously agreed that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue, but split five-to-four (dividing as it
had in Shaw and Miller) on the rationale." Invoking at some length
the Court's prior decisions on Article Ill standing, the majority
concluded that the plaintiffs had not been harmed in a
constitutionally cognizable fashion because they did not live within
the district that the State had designed to be majority-Black.67
The Court's decision to resuscitate standing doctrines in Hays
took all observers-and the parties to the case-by surprise." Under
Northeastern Florida Contractors v. Jacksonville," written only two
Terms prior, it certainly appeared that the Court would allow suit
against state reliance on racial classifications even without direct
proof of harm.70 There seemed little to distinguish a contractor
complaining that race had altered the distribution of bidding
opportunities (even if he individually lost no contract opportunities)
and a citizen of Louisiana claiming that race had altered the
distribution of political opportunities (even if she were not a
63. Id. at 2497 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. Id.
65. 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
66. Id. at 2432.
67. Id. at 2436.
68. Brief for Appellant, Louisiana v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 1311 (1995) (showing that
although the issue was raised, appellants devoted only three pages to the issue in
their brief).
69. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
70. For a discussion of pre-Hays standing issues, see Brian R. Markley, Comment,
Constitutional Provisions in Conflict: Article III Standing and Equal Protections after Shaw
v. Reno, 43 KAN. L. REV. 449 (1995).
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resident of the state-created majority-Black district). More immedi-
ately, the sudden interest in standing brought Hays into direct
conflict with Shaw, in which the Court entertained a challenge to a
district in which no plaintiff resided."'
Equally significant, there was little prospect of the Court
escaping from a controversial case by invoking standing as a gate-
keeper to the court system. The standing requirement in Hays does
not serve as a meaningful threshold to litigation. Plaintiffs in
politically charged cases such as redistricting battles are readily
recruitable from the ranks of the interested political parties. On
remand in Hays itself, the district court permitted a simple
substitution of parties to allow the action to go forward.7 Moreover,
the court then reinstituted its prior oginion, putting the substantive
issue back before the Supreme Court.
This peculiar set of events refocuses the issue on just what
conception of harm the Court was trying to identify in Hays. In
describing the relevant harms of racial gerrymandering, Justice
O'Connor offered a theory that, like Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Miller, turned on the dangers of racial classifications generally. She
did not, however, employ Miller's conception that race-based
decision making is unconstitutional because it serves as a form of
pernicious stereotyping. Invoking the rule against "generalized
grievances," Justice O'Connor instead held:
Where a plaintiff resides in a racially gerrymandered district,
... the plaintiff has been denied equal treatment because of the
legislature's reliance on racial criteria, and therefore has
standing to challenge the legislature's action. Voters in such
districts may suffer the special representational harms racial
classifications can cause in the voting context. On the other
hand, where a plaintiff does not live in such a district, he or
she does not suffer those special harms, and any inference that
the plaintiff has personally been subjected to a racial
classification would not be justified absent specific evidence
tending to support that inference. 74
While this explanation appears narrowly consistent with Shaw's
representational harms, in practice it artfully moves them to the
71. See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights
Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245,278.
72. See Ed Anderson, Activist Pair Labeled Racist; Minority-Based Districts Fought,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Aug. 21,1995, at Al.
73. See Ed Anderson, Cleo Fields' District Rejected; Court Overturns Race-Based
Boundary, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 6, 1996, at A2.
74. Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2436 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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side. According to Hays, in almost all instances, only individuals
who live within a district have standing to challenge it as a racial
gerrymander. While those district residents may suffer represen-
tational harms, they necessarily suffer a denial of equal treatment."
Given the majority's conclusion that "[o]nly those citizens able to
allege injury 'as a direct result of having personally been denied
equal treatment' may bring such a challenge,"76 a reviewing court
need never attempt to muddle through the question of just how rep-
resentational harms occur.
Nonetheless, this peculiar standing doctrine does not elucidate
a coherent view of harm. For example, imagine two White neighbors
wishing to form a political coalition at the local level to advocate for
greater farm subsidies. A line is drawn between their landholdings,
separating them into two distinct legislative districts, one with a
Black majority and the other with a White majority. Assume as well
that the line is drawn for predominantly racial reasons. Is it possible
to believe that one but not the other has had his representational
opportunities conditioned on the basis of race? Furthermore, is it
possible that the primary identity of each as a farmer in need of
subsidies has not been dealt an equal blow regarding his chances of
forming a political coalition on the basis of that primary identity?
The only meaningful distinction between the two farmers is that
one is likely to be represented by a Black-elected official and the
other by a White-elected official. Surely, the Supreme Court does not
intend to turn the notion of standing into an inquiry whether a
particular citizen is represented by an elected official of the other
race, or more broadly, by an elected official whom he opposes. Such
a conception of harm would explode the entire Shaw line of cases
since it would label the failure to be race sensitive in drawing
district lines a potential harm to Black voters who might find
themselves without a Black representative. If anything is to be made
of the Shaw/Miller conception of harm, it must be that there is
something deeply disquieting about governmental assumptions
about the necessary race of a political representative for any partic-
ular group or set of individuals in this society. It would therefore be
preposterous for the Court in Hays to use as the trigger for
constitutional standing the fact that one but not the other White
farmer in our hypothetical illustration would likely be represented
by a Black representative. It is not clear, however, what alternative
the Hays standing doctrine offers.
The Court's fundamental confusion in this regard is evident
75. Id. at 2436.
76. Id. at 2437 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)).
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from Gomillion v. Lightfoot,[ in which the State of Alabama redrew
the boundaries of Tuskegee in a way that was most notable for
excluding ninety-six percent of its Black residents, but almost no
Whites. The Supreme Court held that those statistics and the
"uncouth" "twenty-eight sided" form of the resulting city bound-
aries were sound evidence of racial motivation,8 and the case stands
as the first example of the justiciability of racial gerrymandering
claims-later resurrected by Shaw. As the modem Court has noted,
the racial gerrymandering cases resemble Gomillion in that the
government drew boundary lines in order to include only a certain
racial proportion. But in Hays, Justice O'Connor concluded that only
the citizens within a district were presumptively injured, not those
that were excluded,79 which is to say that the Whites in Tuskegee
could sue but not the excluded Blacks. That reasoning simply fails to
recognize that, in districting, a decision to include one kind of
person is fundamentally also a decision to exclude other kinds of
people.
IV. A COMPARATIVE LOOK: NONINSTRUMENTAL AND INSTRUMENTAL HARMS
In trying to piece together the Supreme Court's view of harm in
the racial redistricting cases, we must conclude that, in only two
years, the same five Justices of the Supreme Court have articulated a
half-dozen different theories of the harms of racial gerryman-
dering. 8 The Court began in Shaw with a vision of "representational
harms": the stigma generated by including widely dispersed
communities in a district based on only their residents' race, and the
risk that elected representatives will respond only to the interests of
a single racial group. For whatever reason, however, the representa-
tional harms were short lived, and the Court is now proceeding
down two different tracks, neither of which accords any special
consideration to the fact that these cases arise in the voting rights
context.
From the Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas camp we are
77. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
78. Id. at 340.
79. See Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2435.
80. The focus of this Article is primarily on the nature of the harm identified by
the majority opinions in Shaw, Miller, and Hays. The dissenting group, now made up
of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer continues to subscribe to a group-
based notion that harm occurs in the presence of a dilution of aggregate
representational opportunities. Their concern resides much more in insuring a
robust pluralism in representative bodies than in the processes by which those
bodies were selected. For a more comprehensive analysis of their views, see Samuel
Issacharoff, The Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 45.
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offered what can be classified as the "noninstrumental harms" of
racial classifications. The name reflects the fact that, while these may
involve some effect upon racially classified individuals, that is not
their defining characteristic. According to Shaw, "racial classifi-
cations are by their very nature odious to a free people."8" Justice
Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Miller added that such classifi-
cations are inherently suspect because they are based on stereotypes
of individuals according to their race, a characteristic deemed
irrelevant by the Fourteenth Amendment.82
This theory of harm is significant precisely because of how far
removed it is from the Court's prior insistence that plaintiffs have
standing only if they prove that the complained-of government
action has had some operative effect upon them. In fact, the essence
of noninstrumental harms is not even the substance of the racial
classification itself. Instead, the harm stems from the government's
reduction of plaintiffs from individuals to categories in enacting the
classification-the racial presumptions upon which the classifi-
cations are ultimately based.3 The demeaning assumption that
members of a certain race share the same beliefs, values, and
preferences is apparently not just the source, but the substance, of
constitutional harm.
That is not to say that a cognizable injury arises absent any
government conduct-from, say, mere legislative deliberations.
However, removing the instrumental impact on individuals from
the calculus greatly lowers the threshold of racial motivation that
gives rise to standing. Carried to its logical conclusion, this theory
would suggest that, even when race is far from a statute's animating
concern, if the legislature acted in part based on what the Court
views as racial stereotypes, it injures the individuals upon whom the
statute operates.
81. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943)).
82. This theme is most forcefully articulated in Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581,
2599 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The basic premises underlying our system of
safe minority districts and those behind the racial register are the same: that
members of the racial group must think alike and that their interests are so distinct
that the group must be provided a separate body of representatives .... Such a
system . . . is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between
candidates and voters that are irrelevant." (citation omitted) (quoting Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 64 (1964))).
83. See, e.g., Katherine I. Butler, Affirmative Racial Gerrymandering: Fair
Representation for Minorities or a Dangerous Recognition of Group Rights?, 26 RUTGERS
L.J. 595, 596 (1995) ("As for the existence of an injury sufficient to support standing,
classification and assignment of citizens according to their race is the injury. The
assignment of citizens to segregated voting districts is no more constitutional than
the assignment of students to segregated schools or the assignment of the public to
segregated drinking fountains.").
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Justice O'Connor, by contrast, appears to be trying to identify a
set of instrumental harms-those that have as their foundation the
effect of racial classifications on individuals.U It is possible to find,
even in O'Connor's initial focus on representational harms in Shaw,
an attempt to fit the concept of harm into an instrumental mold.
Shaw was concerned with stigmatic effects on individuals and the
disruption of representative government although this conception
appears to have evaporated by the time of Hays. By a further stretch,
and we concede that it is indeed a stretch, the same could be said of
the theory of "equal treatment" that O'Connor proffered in Hays."
Unlike Justice Kennedy's interpretation of injury under the Four-
teenth Amendment as government stereotyping, a fully developed
"equal treatment" philosophy would seem to require consideration
of the statute's operation upon individuals, i.e., how it treats them.
For our purposes, the crucial difference between the two
approaches is that while Kennedy's theory would apparently find a
constitutional violation in even those instances in which race has a
fairly minimal input into government decision making, Justice
O'Connor's theory could conceivably account for gradations. To
date, O'Connor's approach appears not to be a regime of strict
liability for race-conscious government action; the legislature's
mindset is not the focus. Instead, a determination must be made
whether the challenged statute in operation is one that presumptively
denies individuals equal treatment on the basis of race. As a logical
construct, therefore, there must necessarily be a set of cases in which,
though race was a factor that the government considered, it does not
so taint the statute as a whole as to separate individuals on the basis
of their race. Just as important, Justice O'Connor apparently views
the class of redistricting plans that do cause injury as relatively
small, given her emphasis in Miller that she views only the
"extreme" instances of gerrymandering as constitutionally suspect.8
And, while Justice Kennedy may too recognize that gerrymanders
come in different degrees, only O'Connor's theory of harm appears
able (or, more likely, intended) to take them into account.
However, it is not possible from Shaw, Miller, and Hays to
84. A simple gauge of the importance of the distinct views that Justice O'Connor
has staked out in these cases is that in the Court's five most recent cases involving
race and voting, she has either written the opinion for the Court or written a
concurrence to stake out her separate position. See Johnson v. Miller, 115 S. Ct. 2475,
2497 (1995) (concurring opinion); United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2433 (1995)
(opinion for the Court); Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2664 (1994)
(concurring opinion); Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581, 2588 (1994) (concurring
opinion); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819 (1993) (opinion for the Court).
85. Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2435.
86. Miller, 115S. Ct. at 2497.
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divine a particular type or degree of racial motivation that triggers
Justice O'Connor's ire-there simply is at this point no open and
safe path for state and local legislatures to travel in their effort to
comply with both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights
Act. We do discern from those opinions, however, one flash point
that has received such venomous attention that it almost certainly is
one of O'Connor's central concerns. All three decisions contain
repeated references to the "maximization" policy of the Justice
Department in recent administrations, through which the
Department would refuse to preclear under section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act proposed voting systems that did not include the
maximum possible number of majority-minority districts.87 Hays in
particular includes an extraordinary and extraneous effort by Justice
O'Connor to bring attention to this issue, in which the Court
describes the Department's attempt to require the maximization of
Louisiana's school districts, and hypothesizes that "[p]erhaps in part
because of its recent experience with [those school] districts, the
Louisiana Legislature set out to create a districting plan containing
two majority-minority districts.""' This emphasis on outside (and in
O'Connor's view illegitimate) pressure from the federal govern-
ment buttresses the Court's suggestions that while courts should
defer to the redistricting decisions of state legislatures, particularly
those that conform to "traditional districting principles," such
policies must be the actual results of the customary political give-
and-take within the states.
CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that our analysis will provide much solace to the
well-intentioned state actor. On the issue of harm, as in the holdings
in general, the Court remains deeply divided over the means and
ends of racial remediation. No matter what the vantage point, there
is no escaping the pivotal role played by Justice O'Connor in
defining the uncertain constitutional parameters of race conscious-
87. See Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2483-84, 2488-89; Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2433-34; Shaw, 113
S. Ct. at 2820.
88. Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2434.
89. Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2664 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that "[t]he Court makes clear that § 2 does not require maximization of
minority voting strength, yet remains faithful to § 2's command that minority voters
be given equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice"); see also id. at 2666 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act remained an open
question and stating that "[als a general matter, the sorting of persons with an intent
to divide by reason of race raises the most serious constitutional questions").
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ness in state decision making. To the extent that Justice O'Connor
has focused on the issue of harm, her concern appears to emanate
from excessively manifest racial considerations in the political give-
and-take surrounding redistricting. She appears both to express a
systemic concern about the corruption to the political process as a
whole (Shaw, Miller) and to want to confine that harm to specific
individuals who have been adversely affected as a consequence
(Hays). The most evident problem is that there are, as yet, no theories
espoused and no facts identified for providing the link between
systemic harms and individual consequences. Until the Court in
general, and Justice O'Connor in particular, can identify why the in-
districted plaintiffs required by Hays suffer from the particularized
form of harm identified in Shaw and Miller, this area will remain a
treacherous quagmire for state actors charged with redistricting, no
matter how well intentioned. At the end of the day, admonitions
from the Supreme Court not to rely excessively on race provide
extraordinarily little guidance for the affected parties. "All things in
moderation" may make for a wise and sensible personal ethos; it
leaves much to be desired as a statement of jurisprudence.
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